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Abstract:  
Modeling the spread of COVID-19 is crucial for informing public health policy. All models for 
COVID-19 epidemiology rely on parameters describing the dynamics of the infection process. 
The meanings of epidemiological parameters like R​0​, R​t​, the “serial interval” and “generation 
interval” can be challenging to understand, especially as these and other parameters are 
conceptually overlapping and sometimes confusingly named. Moreover, the procedures used 
to estimate these parameters make various assumptions and use different mathematical 
approaches that should be understood and accounted for when relying on parameter values 
and reporting them to the public. Here, we offer several insights regarding the derivation of 
commonly-reported epidemiological parameters, and describe how mitigation measures like 
lockdown are expected to affect their values. We aim to present these quantitative 
relationships in a manner that is accessible to the widest audience possible. We hope that 
better communicating the intricacies of epidemiological models will improve our collective 
understanding of their strengths and weaknesses, and will help avoid possible pitfalls when 
using them. 
 
   
Introduction 
Quantitative characterization of the COVID-19 pandemic is a necessary precursor for efforts to 
model the spread of the virus. Epidemiological models rely on numerical parameters like the 
“generation interval” and “household attack rate” whose values and distributions are estimated 
from data about the outbreak. Such estimates are routinely reported in news media and used in 
epidemiological models that inform policy decisions, but the estimates are always uncertain, 
affected by the underlying data and assumptions, and the parameters themselves are mutually 
interrelated and often confusingly described. We previously compiled quantitative data about 
the basic properties of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and its interaction with the human body ​(Bar-On et 
al. 2020)​ to provide a “one-stop” source for clear explanations and annotated references about 
quantitative properties associated with this virus. Here, we aim to provide a similar resource 
focused on numbers used in epidemiological models designed to forecast the spread of the 
virus. In an accompanying study, we provide a compendium of such epidemiological 
parameters and their values. Here, we describe insights gleaned from reading the 
epidemiological literature and collecting estimates for each parameter.  
 
We offer these insights in the form of short vignettes that demonstrate how a quantitative 
description of the COVID-19 epidemic can help us understand information we receive from 
medical professionals and news outlets, and improve our decision making on the personal, 
institutional, and governmental levels. For example, if a person receives a positive PCR test, 
what are the odds she actually has COVID-19? How are these odds affected by the structure of a 
local, regional or corporate testing program? Several vignettes also aim to highlight possible 
biases that arise when estimating key epidemiological parameters. For example, we describe 
how underlying assumptions can greatly affect estimates of the basic and effective 
reproduction numbers (variously called R​0​, and R​e​ or R​t​), a fundamental and widely-reported 
epidemiological parameter. Finally, several vignettes aim to help non-epidemiologists become 
acquainted with key parameters that are less well-known than R​0​ but no less important, for 
example the generation interval or the dispersion of the offspring distribution. 
 
Our collection of vignettes is by no means comprehensive and does not replace detailed 
analysis of the kind that is performed in dedicated studies. In addition, several key parameters 
remain poorly characterized such as the infectiousness of asymptomatic cases, the infectious 
dose of SARS-CoV-2 or the effect of climate on the transmission of COVID-19. Once relevant 
data regarding these parameters will amass, future analysis should address them as well. 
 
Definitions 
 
The basic reproduction number - R​0​: The basic reproduction number of an infection, R​0​, is the 
expected number of secondary infections generated by an average infectious case in an entirely 
susceptible population.  
 
The effective reproduction number - R​e​ or R​t​: The effective reproduction number, R​t ​(also 
denoted by R(t), R and R​e​) is the number of secondary cases generated by an infectious case at 
a given moment (t) once an epidemic is underway. Unlike the basic reproductive number, R​t​ is 
time and situation specific, used to characterize pathogen transmissibility during an epidemic, 
and enabling assessment of the effectiveness  of interventions. 
 
Generation interval​: The average time between infection events in an infector-infectee pair. 
 
Serial interval​: The average time between symptom onsets in an infector-infectee pair. 
 
The dispersion of the offspring distribution - k​: The “offspring distribution” of an epidemic is the 
distribution of the number of secondary cases due to each primary infection. The mean of this 
distribution is R​t​ by definition. The offspring distribution is generally considered to adopt a 
negative binomial distribution which is characterized by a mean (R​t​) and a dispersion parameter 
k. Smaller values of k indicate greater heterogeneity. In general k<<1 is associated with a high 
number of ‘superspreaders’ - individuals that infect much more than the average R​t.​ Values of 
k>1 are associated with a low number of ‘superspreaders’, as the number of secondary cases of 
each primary infection is relatively even. 
 
Household secondary attack rate​: The fraction of the infectee’s household members that they 
infect on average.  
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 How does the basic reproduction number, R​0​, relate to the doubling time of the epidemic? 
The basic reproduction number of an infection, R​0​, is defined as the expected number of 
secondary infections generated by a single infected person when the population is still close to 
entirely susceptible (i.e. at the beginning of an epidemic, when only a small fraction of the 
population has been infected). R​0 ​describes the number of secondary infections, but gives no 
information about the timing of secondary infections. The characteristic time between when a 
primary and secondary infection is called the “generation interval”. Both R​0​ and the generation 
interval vary between individuals, but we can define average values for both of them to 
understand how they govern the spread of SARS-CoV-2. This basic model assumes that the 
pandemic starts with a single infection and the total number of infections, N(t), grows 
exponentially over time so that N(t) = 1 x R​0​(t/g)​. Here ​t​ is the time in days and ​g​ is the generation 
interval, also in days, so that ​t/g​ is unitless. Given this model, the total number of cases should 
increase by a factor of R​0​ every ​g​ days.  
 
Let's consider an example where the number of cases doubles every 4 days. If the generation 
interval ​g​ is known to be ≈4 days as well, then we infer that R​0​ ≈ 2 (as N(t+4)/N(t) = 2 = R​0​(4/4)​ = 
R​0​). If instead the generation interval is known to be 8 days, then a doubling time of two days 
implies R​0​ ≈ 4 (as N(t+4)/N(t) = 2 = R​0​(4/8)​). As such, it’s important to have a high-quality estimate 
of the generation interval, ​g​, when attempting to make inferences about the viral reproduction 
number R​0​. When there is sufficient data to estimate the distribution of generation intervals 
(rather than just the average value), this simple connection between R​0​ and the doubling time (𝜏) 
can be still be applied. See ​(J. Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007)​ for detailed discussion. 
 
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, there was substantial uncertainty about the distribution of 
generation intervals and various researchers used different values to derive estimates of R​0​. As 
such, one should take care in comparing R​0​ values between studies, making sure to evaluate the 
assumptions about the doubling time and generation intervals that were used. Figure 1 
describes the relationship between reported values of R​0​, doubling times and serial intervals 
from various studies of the transmission at the beginning of the epidemic in Wuhan, China. The 
serial interval (the interval between infector and infectee symptom onset) is sometimes used as 
a proxy for the generation interval because it is simpler to estimate from patient reports and 
contact tracing data. R​0​ estimates depend on the assumed serial interval and doubling time in a 
complex fashion, leading to wide variation in reported values ranging from R​0​ ≈ 2-6.    
  
Figure 1: The inter-relation between the estimates of R​0​, the doubling time and the serial 
interval. ​The estimates are presented as a scatter plot versus the assumed mean serial interval 
(equal to the mean generation interval). In a few cases where the assumption regarding the 
serial interval wasn’t explicit, we extracted it from other assumptions of the model. The 
background of the figure is colored by estimates of the doubling times, derived from R​0​, the 
mean serial interval and an assumption that the serial interval is gamma distributed with a 
coefficient of variation of 50% (similar to explicit assumptions in some of the sources). In the 
few cases in which the source provides its estimate for the doubling time, the results are similar 
(but not identical). Markers of studies with identical serial intervals were slightly displaced to 
avoid overlap. The markers are colored by the date on which the model assumes that 
exponential growth began, except for ​(S. Zhao et al. 2020)​ which did not report a start date.  
 
What causes large discrepancies between estimates of R​0​ for the same place? 
Although sources differ in their assumptions about the distribution of generation intervals, these 
differences are not the largest factor affecting the estimated R​0​. We find that a larger influence 
arises from the presumed date on which the epidemic started, denoted t​0​. Sources that 
assumed a start date near Dec. 1 2019 considered a much longer time period than studies 
assuming a start date in January 2020. Fitting over longer time periods resulted in slower 
growth apparent rates in general, as can be seen from the following example. Let's assume that 
on Jan. 20th there were 1024 cases. To get to 1024 cases from 1 patient, it would take 10 
doublings (2​10​ = 1024). So if exponential growth began on the 31​st​ of December that would 
mean a doubling time of 20/10 = 2 days. But if the exponential growth was assumed to begin on 
December 1​st​, that would imply a doubling time of 50/10=5 days. This effect can be seen in 
Figure 1, where the color indicates the t​0​ assumed in each source. Figure 2 shows the 
correlation between the assumed t​0​ and the inferred R​0​. Linear regression gives R​2​=0.52, 
indicating that t​0​ is a relatively strong predictor of the inferred R​0​ value. From the analysis of the 
difference sources, it appears that only one source directly inferred the initial date of 
exponential growth from the model ​(Steven Sanche et al. 2020)​ while the others assumed that 
 growth began on a specific date, even though results are sensitive to this assumption. 
Therefore, it seems that ​wide variation in the exponential growth rate and reproduction number 
across studies of the Wuhan outbreak stem from variation in the choice of a “start date” for the 
epidemic.  
 
Figure 2. Correlation between R​0​ and the assumed initial date of exponential growth. ​The X 
axis gives the initial date of exponential growth assumed in each study. X ticks represent days 
since 25.11.19. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals as given in the studies.​The 
connection between R​0​ and ​t​0​ ​is clear from the linear trend in the scatter plot (least squares 
linear regression R​2​=0.52, P < 10​-3​). 
 
 
How does isolation of infected patients affect the R​0​ and generation interval? 
Quarantine and contact tracing are common means of slowing epidemics like COVID-19. These 
strategies involve the isolation of patients known or likely to be infected. When an individual is 
found to be infected (e.g. by PCR testing), they can be isolated to avoid causing secondary 
infections. Contact tracers can then identify people who have been in close contact with this 
patient in recent days so that those contacts can self-isolate until their infectious period has 
passed. Isolating carriers and their contacts reduces the average number of secondary 
infections produced from a single infection, bringing this number down from the basic 
reproduction number (R​0​, the average number of people an infected person infects with no 
mitigation) to a lower number termed the effective reproduction number or R​t​. Isolation also 
indirectly affects the “generation interval,” which is the characteristic time delay between a 
primary infection and the subsequent transmission event (i.e. infection of a contact). To help 
conceptualize this effect, consider a case in which an infected person infects 4 others over the 
course of 4 days, i.e. averaging one person per day over four days. This translates into an R​t​ of 4 
and an average generation interval of 2.5 days. Now let’s consider the effect of quarantining 
infected people 2 days after infection. Now these individuals can only infect others on the first 
and second days, bringing their personal R​t​ values to 2, and shortening their generation interval 
to (1+2)/2 = 1.5 days. Therefore, isolation and contact tracing will tend to shorten the 
generation interval when compared to earlier stages of the epidemic when no countermeasures 
were in place ​(Bi et al. 2020)​. ​Thus, isolation and contact tracing will tend to affect the growth of 
 the epidemic both in two ways: reducing secondary transmission and also decreasing the 
interval between primary and secondary infections known as the generation interval. 
 
When estimating the effectiveness of an intervention, it is common to look at the effective 
reproduction number (R​t​), as it can be derived from case counts by various methods. However, 
most methods for estimating R​t​ assume that the generation interval stays constant even though 
there is good evidence against this assumption ​(Cori et al. 2013; Jacco Wallinga and Teunis 
2004)​. Hence, these approaches to estimating the effective reproduction number don’t address 
the ‘physical’ meaning of R​t​: the number of infections an infectious person makes on average, 
but an ‘operational’ meaning: the reproduction number derived from the instantaneous growth 
rate, assuming constant generation interval. Because during the progression of the epidemic the 
generation interval usually becomes shorter due to interventions, the actual average number of 
infections an infected person makes (the ‘physical’ R​t​) is generally lower than the ‘operational’ R​t 
for the same instantaneous growth rate. Operational R​t​ values may be useful for predicting the 
trajectory of the epidemic so long as predictions are made via the same model used to infer R​t​. 
Still, care should be taken in interpreting the meaning of these non-physical R​t​ values. 
 
How is the dispersion of the distribution of secondary infections affected by interventions? 
The distribution of secondary infection counts is also known as the “offspring distribution” and 
describes how many individuals each infected person infects. The offspring distribution is 
generally treated as a negative binomial distribution, which is characterized by a mean (R​t​) and a 
dispersion parameter k, such that the variance is given by R​t​(1+R​t​/k). Lower values of k (usually 
< 1) are associated with a larger number of ‘superspreaders’ - individuals who infect many more 
people than the average, R​t.​ Values of k > 1 are associated with a low number of superspreaders, 
as the offspring distribution is tightly clustered around the mean value R​t​ when k is large.  
 
Some of the studies looking at the dispersion of the COVID-19 offspring distribution indicate 
that ‘superspreaders’ play a large role in COVID-19 transmission. One study found that the 
dispersion parameter k is < 0.1, indicating that most of the infections (> 80%) are caused by a 
small fraction of the infected population (by less than 10% of cases) ​(Endo et al. 2020)​. Strict 
interventions like prohibiting large social gatherings, physical distancing, and lockdown mitigate 
the effect of superpreaders by limiting contact between people. It is of importance to 
understand how public health interventions affect the dispersion of the offspring distribution. 
Moreover, since these interventions tend to force people to spend more time at home, studying 
the offspring distribution before and after interventions like lockdown can teach us about the 
dynamics of COVID-19 transmission within households, as we discuss below. 
 
Figure 3 shows estimates of the dispersion of the COVID-19 offspring distribution from eight 
different studies. For each value of k, we also plot the corresponding fraction of infected 
individuals responsible for 80% of transmissions, calculated assuming a negative binomial 
distribution. The results are divided according to the degree of public health interventions 
applied during the study period, i.e. whether strong interventions like lockdown, physical 
distancing and contact tracing were in place. While strong interventions are in effect the 
dispersion parameter is in the range of 0.4-1 indicating that 30%-40% of the infected individuals 
are responsible for 80% of the infections. However, a meta-analysis of data from multiple 
countries which looked at the spread of COVID-19 prior to intervention gave k << 1 ​(Endo et al. 
2020)​. The low estimates for k prior to intervention, indicates a much more prominent role of 
superspreader events, with about 10% of the individuals responsible for 80% of the infections. 
 This difference between the dispersion prior to interventions and after them is also supported 
by a study of transmission in Tianjin, China  ​(Y Zhang et al. 2020)​ finding that government 
control measures increased the dispersion parameter from 0.14 to 0.77. 
 
 
Figure 3. Estimates of the dispersion parameter of COVID-19 and the corresponding fraction 
of infected individuals responsible for 80% of transmissions. ​The fraction of infected 
individuals responsible for 80% of transmissions was estimated from a negative binomial 
distribution following ​(Lloyd-Smith et al. 2005)​. The results are divided according to the 
interventions in the period of the study: cases where physical distancing, contact tracing and 
lockdowns enacted by governments are indicated in green. 
  
What can we learn from the household secondary attack rate? 
The secondary attack rate is defined as the fraction of contacts who become infected. The set 
of people contacted by an infectious individual can be divided into various categories, for 
example household contacts and external contacts (i.e. outside the household). Making such a 
distinction is useful for several reasons. First, identifying household contacts is straightforward, 
which makes determining the secondary attack rate within the household much simpler than 
determining the overall secondary attack rate. Second, many non-pharmaceutical interventions 
such as mask usage, physical distancing, or lockdown affect household contacts differently 
from non household contacts. For example, most people do not wear masks at home. Thus, 
knowing the household attack rate can provide important data for evaluating the efficiency of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions.  
 
Let’s consider a household with four individuals, one of whom is infectious. Our best estimate 
for the household secondary attack rate is ≈15% ​(Bar-On et al. 2020)​. If we assume most 
infections in a household are secondary, i.e. a single household member was infected outside 
 the household and now transmits the infection to a totally susceptible household, the infectious 
household member will infect about 3 x 0.15 ≈ 0.5 others on average. Assuming 
non-pharmaceutical interventions do not impact the behavior of people inside their homes 
significantly and that a significant fraction of new infections occur in households with no 
previous infections, this kind of estimate can be used to estimate a lower bound on the effective 
reproduction number, R​t​ ≥ 0.5. Indeed in many places where lockdown was enforced, the 
effective reproduction number did not decrease much below 0.5 ​(Flaxman et al. 2020)​. This 
calculation also implies that in countries with R​t​ close to 1, a large portion of infections occur at 
home ​(Gudbjartsson et al. 2020)​. Further measures, such as the isolation of infectious 
individuals outside their homes, could potentially bring R​t​ below this figure, as was achieved in 
several places in China ​(Leung et al. 2020; Pan et al. 2020)​. In addition, this calculation makes 
clear that R​t​ during lockdown could be significantly influenced by the size of a representative 
household, which varies by a factor of ≈3 between countries ​(Bradbury et al. 2014)​. Because the 
household reproductive number is dependent on the size of the susceptible population within 
the household, it would decrease throughout the progression of the epidemic as the pool of 
susceptible people within a household is depleted. For example, in a household of 4 people, if 
one person is infected he/she can infect 3 other people. Once one of those people gets infected, 
they now have only 2 other potential people to infect. 
 
What are compartmental models and what assumptions do they make?  
Compartmental models are one of the most prominent tools used to study the pandemic and 
forecast its progression. As the name suggests, these models divide the population into distinct 
compartments which represent different states of infection. The most commonly-used 
compartments are: the susceptible compartment (S), containing people who are susceptible to 
infection but not yet infected; the infectious compartment (I), which includes infected 
individuals who are contagious; and the recovered compartment (R), which includes people who 
were infected but are no longer infectious or susceptible, either because they are no longer 
shedding the virus in high quantities or because they died. These compartments describe the 
“SIR” model. It is common to supplement these compartments with an additional compartment 
called “E” for “exposed” individuals, who are not yet infectious. Models with this extra 
compartment are called SEIR models. Many other elaborations of compartmental models have 
been generated by the addition of new compartments or parallel compartments treating special 
subpopulations like essential workers. When considering compartmental models, it is important 
to note that these models are aimed at describing the transmission of the disease between 
individuals, and not the clinical progression of the disease within an infected individual. Thus, 
the infectious period (which is ≈4 days for half-maximum infectivity) describes the duration in 
which a person is contagious, which is much shorter than the overall duration of illness (on the 
order of a few weeks), as people's illness is usually prolonged due to the inflammatory response 
of the immune system. Therefore, people usually stop being strongly contagious well before 
they recover from the disease.  
 
In SIR and SEIR models, individuals flow through the compartments in a linear fashion - from 
susceptible (S), to exposed (E), to infected (I), to recovered (R). People are assumed to move 
between model compartments at a rate proportional to the number of individuals in the 
compartment. For example, people move from the infectious compartment into the recovered 
compartment at a constant rate, usually noted as 𝛾, which is set as the inverse of the average 
infectious period. In the same manner, people move from the exposed compartment into the 
infectious compartment at a constant rate denoted 𝜎, which is set as the inverse of the average 
 latent period. Using such models, however implicitly assumes a specific type of distribution for 
the latent and infectious periods.  
 
SIR and SEIR models inherently assume that the distribution of latent and infectious periods is 
exponential, as this is the only distribution for which the probability to transition to the next 
compartment is constant and independent of the time spent in the current one (known as a 
“memoryless” distribution). An exponential distribution, however, implies that most people 
spend a very short time in the exposed or infectious states, which is not consistent with the 
inference from documented pairs of infectors and infectees that people are typically contagious 
for ≈4-5 days ​(He et al. 2020)​. Thus, some extended models employ a “trick” to make the 
distributions more realistic. This trick involves splitting up the exposed and infectious 
compartments into N sub-compartments each, and multiplying the rate at which people move 
between those sub-compartments by the N. This way, the sum of people in the exposed 
sub-compartment represents all the exposed people, and the same holds true for the infectious 
compartment. Now, however, the time spent in the exposed or infectious compartments will be 
distributed as a sum of N exponentials, which is called the Erlang distribution. This distribution 
is similar in shape to the distributions observed when studying infector-infectee pairs ​(Ferretti et 
al. 2020; He et al. 2020)​. 
 
How do the testing false positive and false negative rates affect the capacity of organisations 
to test their constituents and track the disease?  
 
Given the massive economic implications of lockdown and the low prevalence of COVID-19 in 
many locations, it is natural for organizations like businesses, government agencies, hospitals 
and academic institutions to consider comprehensive testing as a means of tracking the 
disease while resuming partial or full operations. Yet the sensitivity and specificity of current 
PCR testing methods complicates this approach (see relevant sections on RT-qPCR error rates 
for numbers and references). Suppose your organization has 1000 employees and you test all 
of them. If the false positive rate is ≈1%, you are likely to get 10 false positive test results. That 
is, 10 people who you will presume are infected, but are not. Even if the false positive rate is as 
low as ≈0.2%, you get 2 false positives on average. False negatives are even more alarming - 
these represent people who actually have COVID-19 but whose infection you don’t detect in a 
single test. If 0.5% of employees have COVID-19, then there are on average five sick employees. 
With a 20% false negative rate, you will detect roughly four of five sick employees and miss one 
who can infect others. In this scenario, you expect to detect 80% of sick individuals (also 
defined as the ‘sensitivity’ of the assay), but only 4/14 (≈30%) of your positive test results 
represent people who are actually infected. Detecting 80% of true infections can be very useful 
in suppressing the spread, but at the same time it shows one cannot achieve perfect answers 
with a single test. Rather, the costs and benefits of a testing regime will depend on the error 
rates and the manner in which positive tests are treated, i.e. whether quarantine and contact 
tracing are applied. As we discuss below, confirmatory testing by other means (e.g. evaluating 
symptoms, taking CT scans of the lungs, or group testing approaches) can greatly increase the 
overall accuracy of a testing regime. Moreover, due to interaction with the wider community, the 
whole testing operation should be repeated regularly, and in each such iteration one should be 
cognizant of the implications of false positive and false negative rates.   
 
 How different are your pre- and post-testing odds of having COVID-19?  
Because of the relatively high false negative rates associated with PCR testing (10-30%), a 
negative test does not necessarily imply a clean bill of health. Suppose you live in a location 
where ≈0.5% of the local population currently has the disease and does not know it. Let’s further 
suppose that you got a negative result from a PCR test. What are the odds that you actually 
have COVID-19 even though you tested negative? This can be calculated by applying Bayes 
theorem: P(C|-) = P(-|C) x P(C) / P(-) where “C” is the event you have COVID-19 and “-” is the 
event your test was negative. P(C|-) thus denotes the probability that you are a carrier despite a 
negative test result. The probability of a negative test given that you have COVID-19, P(-|C), is 
just the false negative rate. Though this value varies widely across literature reports, we will use 
a 20% false negative rate here (see “RT-qPCR False Negative Rate”). We assumed that the 
pre-test probability you have the disease, P(C), is 0.5%. The total probability of a negative test, 
P(-), can be decomposed into contributions from false negatives and true negatives: P(-) = P(C) 
x P(-|C) + P(H) x P(-|H), where “H” is the event that you are healthy. Taking the true negative rate 
P(-|H) to be 100% minus the false positive rate of ≈1% (0.2-2%, see relevant section) then P(-) ≈ 
0.005 x 0.2 + 0.995 x (1-0.01) ≈ 99%. We therefore arrive at P(C|-) ≈ 0.2 x 0.005 / 0.99 = 0.1%. A 
negative test decreases your odds of having the disease by a factor of roughly 5 (from 0.5% to 
0.1%) under this particular set of assumptions, and so a single test cannot fully rule out the 
possibility of having the virus. This factor of 5 roughly scales as the inverse of the 20% false 
negative rate we started with (1/0.2 = 5). While this calculation shows the limitations of testing 
from the perspective of a single person, this calculation of the predictive value of a negative test 
is also very important from a public health perspective, as we discussed in the previous section.  
 
Let’s consider a positive test: what are the odds of actually being COVID-free even though your 
test was positive? Again, P(H|+) = P(+|H) x P(H) / P(+) where “H” is the event you are healthy and 
“+” is the event your test was positive. P(+|H) is just the false positive rate and P(H) was 
assumed to be ≈ 99.5%. We will assume a false positive rate P(+|H) ≈ 0.2%. This value is at the 
bottom end of the reported range (0.2-3%, see “RT-qPCR False Positive Rate”), corresponding to 
the lowest reported value for RT-qPCR testing for influenza ​(Merckx et al. 2017)​. We choose this 
low number because, as of writing, the total positive test rate is around 0.2% in some countries 
(e.g. Estonia, Denmark, see ​Our World In Data for July 3rd 2020​). Given these values, the total 
odds of a positive test, P(+), is the sum of true positives and false positives: P(C) x P(+|C) + P(H) 
x P(+|H) = 0.005 x (1-0.2) + 0.995 x 0.002 ≈ 0.6%. We can now calculate P(H|+) = 0.002 x 0.995 / 
0.006 ≈ 33%. In words: even when the false positive rate is low (0.2%), the post-test odds of 
being healthy despite a positive test, P(H|+), can still be quite high. Here we calculated ≈30% 
odds assuming that 0.5% of the local population is infected, implying that only ≈70% of positive 
tests came from infected individuals.  Moreover, we made an optimistic assumption about the 
false positive rate. It is important to measure the false positive rate since plausible higher 
values (e.g. 1%) substantially degrade the information content of positive tests. For example, 
setting P(+|H) = 1% gives P(H|+) ≈ 70%, meaning that a positive test would correspond to only 
30% odds of having COVID-19.  
 
In practice, PCR testing is not usually applied to individuals chosen at random from the local 
population. Rather, people often seek testing and treatment when they have COVID-like 
symptoms or have been in close contact with confirmed cases. Let’s assume that there are 20 
times more people with COVID-19-like symptoms than symptomatic COVID-19 infectees, i.e. 
that the COVID-19 infectees are 5% of the symptomatic population (as compared to 0.5% of the 
population at large).  If we recalculate the odds of being COVID-free after a positive test, we get 
 P(H|+) ≈ 0.002 x (1 - 0.05) / 0.042 ≈ 5%, representing a ≈6-fold decrease in the total number of 
false positives from ≈30% of all tests to ≈5% in this case. Since testing symptomatic patients is 
much more informative than testing the population at large, it follows that other means of 
selecting likely candidates for testing, e.g. by CT scans, other diagnostics, or even a second PCR 
test, can similarly improve the information content of a COVID-19 testing program.  
 
What is the effect of double testing patients by RT-qPCR?  
PCR testing of patient samples is the primary mode of diagnosing patients presenting COVID-19 
symptoms. In the sections dedicated to the accuracy of PCR testing we gave references 
supporting an RT-qPCR false negative rate of ≈20% and a false positive rate ≈1%. In general, 
false negatives are far more concerning than false positives because they are much more likely 
and also because the consequences are far more serious: a false negative results in improper 
treatment of an infected individual and, if abundant, false negatives are likely to result in 
increased transmission. Several sources recommend multiple testing of patient samples to 
reduce the number of false negatives.  
 
Let’s consider a patient who is, in fact, infected with SARS-CoV-2. If repeated RT-qPCR tests are 
statistically independent and conducted at roughly the same time (relative to the onset of 
symptoms) then they should each have the same false negative rate of ≈20%. The odds of 
getting two negative tests given a positive patient should then be 0.2​2​ = 4%. In contrast, ​(Jiang 
et al. 2020)​ report a ​22% false negative rate for a single test and 14% for two tests. If tests were 
independent, the two-test rate should have been reduced to ≈5% (a 17 percentage points 
reduction) but double-testing gave an empirical false negative rate of ≈14% (an 8 percentage 
points reduction). So double-testing had roughly half the expected effect in this instance. This 
calculation implies that PCR tests are not fully independent. One reason that this might be the 
case is that the second test is always conducted after the first and patient viral loads change 
over time, typically decreasing below the limit of detection ≈10 days after symptoms (see 
“Duration of PCR positivity”).  
 
Let’s consider two subsequent RT-qPCR tests. If we assume that the first test was conducted 
when the patient had near-maximal viral load (3-4 days after symptom onset, ≈20% false 
negatives) and the second test was conducted two days later, it might have a substantially 
greater false negative rate approaching 40-50% as reported in Figure 2 of ​(J. Zhao Jr. et al. 
2020)​. If the first test has a false negative rate of 22% and the second ≈50%, then the two-test 
rate should be about 14%, similar to the 14% rate observed. Recent modeling efforts by 
(Wikramaratna et al. 2020)​ performed similar, albeit more sophisticated calculations of the 
effect of multiple testing assuming a 1 day delay between subsequent tests, arriving at false 
negative rates similar to those empirically observed for two-sample RT-qPCR. As PCR-positivity 
is observed to decrease over time, their calculation recommends rapid testing with quick 
turnaround times early in the disease progression (i.e. quickly after symptoms present) to 
minimize the false negative rate of both single and double tests ​(Wikramaratna et al. 2020; 
Larremore et al. 2020)​.  
 
Another potential explanation for non-independence of repeated tests is that there is a 
physiological cause for false negative results (e.g. certain patients produce less sputum). 
Physiological differences between patients would also produce correlation between repeated 
tests.  
 
